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ABSTRACT 
Key distribution and management in applications that use public key 
cryptosystems generally rely on Public Key Infrastructures (PKI). In this thesis, the 
disadvantages of this approach are discussed and an e-mail system that performs public 
key distribution and management in a unique way is proposed. The name of this system 
is "Practical and Secure E-Mail System" ("PractiSES"). 
PractiSES does not use the certification mechanisms of PKIs. A central authority, 
which is trusted by all users, takes the responsibility of key distribution and 
management in PractiSES. PractiSES Client is an e-mail application that is designed for 
end users. On top of regular e-mail client features, PractiSES Client can also be used to 
exchange e-mails among users in encrypted and/or signed fashion. 
PractiSES is designed according to the phases of "Object Oriented Analyses and 
Design (OOAD)". It is implemented using Java programming language. In PractiSES, 
there are several secure protocols developed for initializing users, removing and 
updating public keys of the users and obtaining the others' public keys. Key 
management and distribution features of PractiSES do not let the e-mail addresses move 
around in an uncontrolled fashion - this is one of the problems of PKI based systems. 
Moreover, certificate revocation problem does not exist in PractiSES. The trust 
mechanism of PractiSES is simple and straightforward so that an average user can 
easily use. Those characteristics of PractiSES make it "practical". On the other hand, 
PractiSES supports enough security features, such as authentic registration, encryption 
and digital signatures. 
The first version of PractiSES will be for closed-group e-mail exchange. 
PractiSES will be a free application that can be used without any warranty by 
companies and universities. 
 vii 
ÖZET 
 Açık anahtar tabanlı kriptografi algoritmalarını kullanan sistemler anahtar 
daıtım ve yönetim ilerini genellikle açık anahtar altyapıları (PKI) ile yaparlar. Bu 
tezde bu yaklaımın sorunlarından bahsedilmitir ve anahtar daıtım ve yönetimini 
kendine özgü bir ekilde yapan bir e-posta sistemi önerilmitir. Bu e-posta sistemi 
“Pratik ve Güvenli E-posta” (“PGE”) olarak adlandırılmıtır. 
PGE açık anahtar altyapılarından farklı olarak anahtar daıtımında 
sertifikalandırma yöntemini kullanmaz. PGE sisteminde bütün kullanıcıların güvendii 
merkezi bir otorite (sunucu) anahtar daıtımını üstlenir. Anahtar yönetimi de bu otorite 
tarafından yerine getirilir. PGE sisteminin kullanıcılarına bakan kısmı kullanıcı e-posta 
programlarıdır. Bu programlar normal bir e-posta programının özelliklerine sahiptir ve 
kullanıcılarının açık anahtar tabanlı kriptografi algoritmalarını kullanarak, kendi 
aralarında ifreli ve/veya imzalı e-posta göndermelerini de salar. 
PGE nesneye dayalı analiz ve tasarım (OOAD) aamalarına uyularak 
gerçeklenmitir. PGE’nin gerçeklenmesinde Java programlama dili kullanılmıtır. PGE 
sisteminde, son kullanıcıların kendi açık anahtarlarını açık anahtar deposuna 
koyabilmeleri, depodan silebilmeleri, yenileyebilmeleri ve baka kullanıcıların açık 
anahtarlarını depodan alabilmeleri için güvenli protokoller tasarlanmıtır. PGE 
sisteminin anahtar daıtım ve yönetim mekanizması, PKI tabanlı sistemlerde olduu 
gibi kullanıcıların e-posta adreslerinin kontrolsüz dolaımına izin vermez. PGE’de 
sertifika iptali ve onun getirdii problemlere rastlanmaz. PGE’nin güven mekanizması 
ortalama kullanıcıların kolayca kullanabilecekleri kadar basit ve düzgündür. Bütün bu 
özellikler PGE sistemini “pratik” yapmaktadır. PGE ifreleme, imzalama ve 
dorulayarak kayıt yapma gibi özellikleri destekledii için yeterince “güvenli” bir e-
posta sistemidir.  
 viii 
PGE sisteminin ilk sürümü organizasyon içi e-posta deiimini 
salayacaktır. PGE uygulaması, irket ve üniversite gibi kuruluların hiç bir ücret 
ödemeden kullanmalarına izin vermektedir. 
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ABSTRACT 
Key distribution and management in applications that use public key 
cryptosystems generally rely on Public Key Infrastructures (PKI). In this thesis, the 
disadvantages of this approach are discussed and an e-mail system that performs public 
key distribution and management in a unique way is proposed. The name of this system 
is "Practical and Secure E-Mail System" ("PractiSES"). 
PractiSES does not use the certification mechanisms of PKIs. A central authority, 
which is trusted by all users, takes the responsibility of key distribution and 
management in PractiSES. PractiSES Client is an e-mail application that is designed for 
end users. On top of regular e-mail client features, PractiSES Client can also be used to 
exchange e-mails among users in encrypted and/or signed fashion. 
PractiSES is designed according to the phases of "Object Oriented Analyses and 
Design (OOAD)". It is implemented using Java programming language. In PractiSES, 
there are several secure protocols developed for initializing users, removing and 
updating public keys of the users and obtaining the others' public keys. Key 
management and distribution features of PractiSES do not let the e-mail addresses move 
around in an uncontrolled fashion - this is one of the problems of PKI based systems. 
Moreover, certificate revocation problem does not exist in PractiSES. The trust 
mechanism of PractiSES is simple and straightforward so that an average user can 
easily use. Those characteristics of PractiSES make it "practical". On the other hand, 
PractiSES supports enough security features, such as authentic registration, encryption 
and digital signatures. 
The first version of PractiSES will be for closed-group e-mail exchange. 
PractiSES will be a free application that can be used without any warranty by 
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 Açık anahtar tabanlı kriptografi algoritmalarını kullanan sistemler anahtar 
daıtım ve yönetim ilerini genellikle açık anahtar altyapıları (PKI) ile yaparlar. Bu 
tezde bu yaklaımın sorunlarından bahsedilmitir ve anahtar daıtım ve yönetimini 
kendine özgü bir ekilde yapan bir e-posta sistemi önerilmitir. Bu e-posta sistemi 
“Pratik ve Güvenli E-posta” (“PGE”) olarak adlandırılmıtır. 
PGE açık anahtar altyapılarından farklı olarak anahtar daıtımında 
sertifikalandırma yöntemini kullanmaz. PGE sisteminde bütün kullanıcıların güvendii 
merkezi bir otorite (sunucu) anahtar daıtımını üstlenir. Anahtar yönetimi de bu otorite 
tarafından yerine getirilir. PGE sisteminin kullanıcılarına bakan kısmı kullanıcı e-posta 
programlarıdır. Bu programlar normal bir e-posta programının özelliklerine sahiptir ve 
kullanıcılarının açık anahtar tabanlı kriptografi algoritmalarını kullanarak, kendi 
aralarında ifreli ve/veya imzalı e-posta göndermelerini de salar. 
PGE nesneye dayalı analiz ve tasarım (OOAD) aamalarına uyularak 
gerçeklenmitir. PGE’nin gerçeklenmesinde Java programlama dili kullanılmıtır. PGE 
sisteminde, son kullanıcıların kendi açık anahtarlarını açık anahtar deposuna 
koyabilmeleri, depodan silebilmeleri, yenileyebilmeleri ve baka kullanıcıların açık 
anahtarlarını depodan alabilmeleri için güvenli protokoller tasarlanmıtır. PGE 
sisteminin anahtar daıtım ve yönetim mekanizması, PKI tabanlı sistemlerde olduu 
gibi kullanıcıların e-posta adreslerinin kontrolsüz dolaımına izin vermez. PGE’de 
sertifika iptali ve onun getirdii problemlere rastlanmaz. PGE’nin güven mekanizması 
ortalama kullanıcıların kolayca kullanabilecekleri kadar basit ve düzgündür. Bütün bu 
özellikler PGE sistemini “pratik” yapmaktadır. PGE ifreleme, imzalama ve 
dorulayarak kayıt yapma gibi özellikleri destekledii için yeterince “güvenli” bir e-
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public key cryptosystems (PKC systems)[1] are used extensively in network 
security and authentication applications. In PKC systems, every user has a key pair that 
is created by its owner. The private key is used to decrypt messages and digitally sign 
information; therefore, they must be kept secret. On the other hand, the public keys are 
used to encrypt messages and to verify digital signatures; since these operations can be 
carried out by anyone, everyone can know the public keys. PKC systems propose strong 
security. 
In order to use public key cryptography in an application, its key distribution and 
key management problems should be solved first. Problems related with the life cycle of 
public keys are generally named as key management problems. Public key removal, 
update and recovery are the most common key management operations. Distribution of 
public key with legitimate bindings with the owner’s identity is the key distribution 
problem. In order to solve this problem, a trusted third party is inevitably necessary. 
Trusted third parties are the organizations that people agree on their trustworthiness. If 
the trusted third party states that a public key belongs to a particular user, then people 
who trust the trusted third party make sure about the legitimacy of that public key. 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [2] and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [3] propose 
solutions to key distribution and management problems. 
 PKI is an architecture of the Certification Authorities (CAs) which produce 
certificates. Certificates are the digital documents that are used as binding between user 
identity with user’s public key. Secure Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extension 
(S/MIME) [4] applications use digital certificates in which there is a public key used to 
encrypt the messages and verify the signatures in secure Internet messaging. S/MIME is 
a protocol that provides secure Internet message exchange between parties. S/MIME 
needs certificates issued by CAs of PKI. There are several problems related with 
certificates. Certificates can tour in the Internet and some information (e.g. e-mail 
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address) in certificates may be distributed to un-intended people. Privacy-
sensitive people criticize this situation. Certificates are generally not free and there are 
some shortcomings in free ones. There are some difficulties in certifying people such as, 
registration obligation to Registration Authority (RA), and constructing/validating the 
certification path from X.500 Directories [5, 6]. 
PGP is itself an e-mail application in which trusting to someone else is left to 
user’s own criteria. Since there is no trusted third party in PGP, its key server that keeps 
the users’ public keys does not guarantee the legitimacy of the keys in it. 
PKC systems are mostly used in e-mail applications. PGP and S/MIME have 
several problems and difficulties which are mentioned above. In this thesis, we propose 
a new e-mail system that is secure and more practical than PGP and S/MIME. Name of 
our system is “Practical and Secure E-Mail System” (“PractiSES”). PractiSES provides 
encrypted and/or signed message interchange between parties by using PKC systems as 
a base. The objective of PractiSES is to eliminate the difficulties and problems of 
S/MIME and PGP.  
PractiSES defines trusted third parties (a server) for closed-groups. The server 
distributes the public keys using the server’s signature. It provides a practical way for 
key distribution. Registered users can facilitate the security features of PractiSES just 
after initialization protocol. Initialization protocol uploads user’s public key to server’s 
public key storage. Users can remove and update their current public keys and learn 
others’ public keys with secure protocols. Trusting a key is straightforward since it 
escapes use of certificates and defines a centralized trusted third party. However, 
S/MIME applications face with problems of certificates and PGP suffers from absence 
of a trusted third party and pays its cost by complicated trust mechanism. 
PractiSES has a practical client Graphical User Interface (GUI) that has English 
and Turkish language support. 
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The structure of thesis is mentioned in the following paragraphs. 
In Section 2, background information including fundamentals of cryptography, 
security problems and solutions, problems of PKC systems and solutions to them are 
given. Contribution of thesis is also summarized there.  
Section 3 deals with design and development of PractiSES. The architecture, 
properties, and components of PractiSES are explained in this section. The advantages 
of PractiSES over S/MIME and PGP are also given.  
In Section 4, cryptographic structures and functions that are used in PractiSES, are 
detailed. The requirements and deployment of PractiSES system are also described here. 
Conclusion and future works that can be carried out to improve the current status 
of PractiSES are given in Section 5.  
Section 6, 7, 8, and 9 are appendices. In Section 6 the acronyms are listed. Section 
7 shows the security dialogs that are used in the system. The snapshots of 
sending/receiving e-mails in PractiSES Client GUI are figured out in Section 8. Section 
9 gives the details of the possible e-mail message structures in PractiSES. 
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
In today’s world, keeping information away from adversaries plays an important 
role in our lives. Most of the people, who are communicating, had developed different 
types of encoding/decoding techniques while transmitting sensitive information. The 
number of connected people over the world, and consequently the demand for 
information services in electronic platforms, are constantly increasing. Many types of 
critical operations are performed in the electronic systems. Giving credit card number 
while purchasing on the Internet, banking transactions over the Internet and exchanging 
military messages are just some of the samples of critical operations. 
2.1. Security Requirements 
The data sent over computer networks are sensitive to attacks by adversaries.  
Private/sensitive information must be protected from others since the malicious 
adversaries can read and/or alter the message content or masquerade himself/herself as 
someone else. In order to make sure that the information is secure, four main 
requirements are considered. These are authentication, integrity, non-repudiation and 
confidentiality. 
2.1.1. Authentication 
Authentication [7] is a process of proving and verifying certain information in a 
communication. Verifying the origin of a document, identifying the sender and/or the 
receiver, identifying a specific hardware device (a computer, printer, etc.), and verifying 
the time that a document is sent are some of the examples of authentication processes. 
This service can be realized by several cryptographic operations.   
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2.1.2. Integrity 
Data may be altered, inserted, deleted or misordered by an unauthorized adversary 
during communication. Integrity is a process of ensuring that the message is received as 
it is sent. The receiver of the message wants to make sure that the received data has not 
been manipulated on the way. This service can be realized by Hash Functions and 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Hash Function [8] and MAC [8] will be 
discussed later in Section 2.2.4 and Section 2.2.5. 
2.1.3. Non-Repudiation 
Non-Repudiation is a process of preventing a sender from denying a transmitted 
data. By this way, the sender of the message cannot claim that he/she did not send the 
message. This service can be realized by Digital Signatures [9] as explained in Section 
2.3.3. 
2.1.4. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is a process of protecting the data from disclosure to unauthorized 
adversaries during a communication. Confidentiality means that the message can only 
be read by authorized people (sender and the receivers), since it prevents the 
eavesdroppers to observe the data during a communication. This service can be realized 
by encryption/decryption operations.  
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2.2. Overview of Cryptography  
The word cryptography means hidden or secret writing. Cryptography is the study 
of secure communication over in-secure channels. Suppose that, Bob wants to declare 
his love to Alice in basic communication model shown in Figure 1. Bob wants to send a 
love message to Alice and he does not want the content of message to be read by 
anyone else. If a communication network is in-secure, he has to encrypt the message 
content. On the other hand, Alice can decrypt the encrypted message. 
 
Figure 1. Basic Communication Model 
Cryptologists have studied all kinds of problems related with security 
requirements that are discussed in Section 2.1. The common approaches can be 
categorized into two families of algorithms. One of them is symmetric cryptography and 
the other is the asymmetric cryptography. Asymmetric cryptography is sometimes 
called as public key cryptography. The systems based on public key cryptography are 
called as public key cryptosystems. Public key cryptosystems can be used for providing 
authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation and integrity services. 
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2.2.1. Symmetric Cryptography 
Symmetric cryptography is the traditional form of the cryptography in which the 
same key is used for both encryption and decryption. Therefore, the key should be kept 
as secret between the communicating parties. Symmetric cryptography may also 
provide authentication service by using MACs, which will be discussed in Section 
2.2.5.  
 
Figure 2. Communication Model with Symmetric Cryptography 
Figure 2 shows the communication of Bob and Alice by using symmetric 
cryptography algorithms. Suppose Bob wants to send a message to Alice with 
symmetric cryptography. First, he decides a secret key together with Alice. Then, he 
uses that key while encrypting. On the other hand, Alice uses the same secret key while 
decrypting. 
Well-known symmetric cryptography algorithms are the Rijndael that is accepted 
as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [10], the Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
[18], International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [11], RC6 and RC5 [12]. 
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2.2.2. Public Key Cryptography (PKC) 
In symmetric cryptography, getting the sender and the receiver to agree on the 
same key is a challenging issue, especially if they are in different physical locations. In 
order to solve this problem, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman invented a new 
concept called as public key cryptography in 1976 [1]. Public key cryptography is also 
called as asymmetric cryptography since -unlike to symmetric cryptography- different 
keys are used in encryption and decryption. In public key cryptosystems, every user has 
a key pair. One is public key that is freely available to everyone; the other is private key 
that is known only by the owner and should be kept secret. The most important and 
appealing property of a key pair is that obtaining a private key from a public key is 
practically impossible, although they are mathematically related to each other. Public 
keys are generally used for encryption of messages and verification of digital signatures. 
On the other hand, the private keys are used for decryption of  encrypted messages and 
issuance of digital signatures. 
 
Figure 3. Communication Model with PKC for Encryption/Decryption  
Figure 3 shows the communication of Bob and Alice by using public key 
cryptography algorithms. Suppose Bob wants to send a secret message to Alice using 
public key cryptography. In public key cryptography, encryption/decryption is very 
 9
simple. Bob gets Alice’s public key from public key storage and uses it for 
encrypting the message. When Alice gets an encrypted message, she uses her own 
private key for decrypting the message. The encrypted message can only be decrypted 
by the private key of corresponding public key.  
 
 
Figure 4. Communication Model with PKC for Signing/Verification 
Figure 4 shows that Bob sends a digitally signed message to Alice by using public 
key cryptography algorithms. Bob uses his private key for digitally signing the message. 
When Alice gets the signed message from Bob, she gets Bob’s public key from public 
key storage and uses it for verifying the signature of Bob on the message. 
The most popular public key cryptography algorithm is RSA [13] which is 
invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1977 at MIT [14]. There are other public 
key cryptography algorithms [48] in use such that Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem [15] and 
ElGamal Cryptosystem [16]. 
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2.2.3. Comparison of Symmetric Cryptography and Public Key 
Cryptography 
It is not necessary to transmit private keys in public key cryptography. This is a 
security-improving feature. In symmetric cryptography, secret keys must be transmitted 
over a communication channel or in an offline manner. Another major advantage of 
public key cryptography is that it provides non-forgeable digital signatures, which 
cannot be repudiated. In PKC systems, users cannot claim that their private key is 
compromised since the responsibility for protection of  the private key is totally belongs 
to the owner, not to any central database. The main disadvantage of public key 
cryptography with respect to symmetric cryptography is speed. Symmetric 
cryptography algorithms operate much faster than public key cryptography algorithms. 
The best solution to provide both security and speed is employing Digital Enveloping 
mechanism that will be discussed in Section 2.3.5. That mechanism collates best parts 
of public key cryptography and symmetric cryptography. It should be clearly 
understood that the aim of public key cryptography is not to replace symmetric 
cryptography; they have to be used together.   
2.2.4. Hash Function 
Hash function is a function used for calculating the message digest that is 
sometimes called as message fingerprint. Hash function is a one-way function that 
produces fixed size output, given variable sized inputs. It is computationally infeasible 
to find out original message from the hash value. Besides, finding out two messages that 
produce the same hash result is also impractical. Hash functions are used in digital 
signatures and for integrity check. Some of the mostly used hash functions are Message 
Digest-5 (MD5) [17] and Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA1) [8]. MD5 produces 128-bit 
digest, SHA-1 produces 160-bit digest. 
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2.2.5. Message Authentication Codes (MAC) 
Message authentication code is an authentication value (a checksum) derived from 
the message. It is similar to digital signatures of the PKC systems. The only difference 
between MAC and digital signatures is that the same key is used for computing and 
verifying the MAC, whereas different keys are used in computing and verifying the 
digital signatures.  
2.3. Cryptographic Solutions to Security Problems 
In this section, we will discuss the cryptographic solutions and applications to 
security problems in a detailed way. 
2.3.1. Confidentiality with Symmetric Encryption 
Encrypting the data is a universal technique for providing confidentiality to data 
transmission. The original data is called as plaintext; the encrypted one is called as 
cipher text. Without knowing the secret key, the plaintext cannot be restored from the 
cipher text. 
Suppose Bob wants to send an encrypted message for Alice. First, he should agree 
on a secret key with Alice in a secure way. He then, encrypts the message content with 
that key and sends over the insecure media (see Figure 2 in Section 2.2.1). If an 
adversary intercepts the encrypted message, he/she cannot restore it without knowing 
the symmetric key. Therefore, if the message has arrived to Alice, then it is obvious that 
this message is sent in a confidential way. 
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2.3.2. Message Integrity with Shared-Secret 
Message integrity can be provided in several ways. Two of them will be discussed 
here. Presumably, it is supposed that Bob and Alice has the same shared-secret (actually 
it is a password string) and Bob wants to send a message to Alice by ensuring the 
integrity of the content. 
i. Integrity with MAC 
 
Figure 5. Message Integrity with MAC 
Figure 5 shows the communication of Bob and Alice by using MAC. Bob gives 
both the message and shared-secret to the MAC function, then appends the output MAC 
value to the original message. He sends the message and the MAC value to Alice. Alice 
performs the same operations. First, she calculates the MAC value of the message that 
she has just received and then compares the received MAC value with calculated one. If 
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they are the same, then Alice makes sure that the message has not been altered 
on the way and originates from Bob. 
ii. Integrity with Hash Function 
 
Figure 6. Message Integrity with Hash 
Figure 6 shows the communication of Bob and Alice by using hash function. Bob 
appends the shared-secret value to the message and calculates the hash value of the 
message combined with shared-secret. He sends the original message and the hash value 
to Alice. She first takes the message and appends the shared-secret to it, then calculates 
the hash value with using the same hash function that Bob used. After that, she 
compares whether the received hash is equal to the one she calculated. If they are equal, 
then she makes sure that the message has been arrived to her unchanged. 
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2.3.3. Digital Signatures  
Digital signature [19, 20] is an ultimate mechanism for providing non-repudiation. 
The main difference between digital signatures and hand-written signatures is that 
digital signatures are totally related with the content, while hand-written signatures are 
not. Because, a digital signature is a piece of data generated from the message content. 
They are generated by using private keys that are kept secret by the owner. It is more 
preferable to sign the hash (much shorter than the message) of the message instead of 
the message itself because of the performance reasons.  
 
Figure 7. Digitally Signed Message 
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Figure 7 shows the communication of Bob and Alice by using digital 
signatures. Suppose Bob wants to send a digitally signed message to Alice. Initially he 
applies the hash function to the message and creates the hash. Then, he passes this hash 
value and his private key to the signing function to produce his signature on this 
message. He sends both the message and the signature to Alice. Alice obtains Bob’s 
public key from public key storage and gives it to the verification function with the 
received message and the digital signature. If the function verifies the signature, then it 
means that the message has been definitely signed by the private key that corresponds to 
the public key used in verification. With this signature, Alice can make sure that 
message is from Bob and unchanged. In this way, authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation services are satisfied.  
2.3.4. Key Agreement 
Key agreement is a protocol that provides two or more users to agree upon a key 
for using in symmetric cryptosystems. Key agreement protocols allow people to decide 
on the same key in a secure way over insecure channels without predetermined shared-
secret. A characteristic example is Digital Envelopes, which will be discussed in the 
next section. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol [18] is another well-known key 
agreement protocol. 
 16
2.3.5. Digital Envelopes 
 
 
Figure 8. Digital Enveloping 
Digital envelope is an attractive solution for fast message exchange that utilizes 
speed of symmetric cryptography and security of public key cryptography. A digital 
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envelope consists of two parts: One is the encrypted message using a symmetric 
key and the other is the symmetric key encrypted with the public key of the receiver 
using public key cryptography. 
Suppose Bob wants to envelope his message for Alice as it is shown in Figure 8. 
First, he chooses a symmetric key at random and encrypts the message with that key. 
Then, he gets Alice’s public key from public key storage and uses it to encrypt the 
symmetric key. He sends the encrypted message and the encrypted symmetric key to 
Alice. When Alice receives the digital envelope, she decrypts the encrypted symmetric 
key by using her private key and derives the symmetric key. Then, she decrypts the 
encrypted message by using the derived symmetric key. Finally she gets the original 
message, which is received as it is sent by Bob. 
Digital envelope increases the performance of key exchange without sacrifying 
the security. 
2.4. Key Distribution and Management in PKC Systems 
Although PKC systems are more secure, they have some challenging problems. In 
PKC systems, everyone needs to make sure that the public key definitely belongs to the 
intended user. Otherwise, that public key should not be used, since it may belong to a 
wrong person. In this section, we will discuss the key distribution and management 
problems of PKC systems and solutions. 
2.4.1. Key Management Problems 
Problems related with the life-cycle of public keys are generally named as Key 
Management Problems [21] in PKC systems. Public key removal, update and recovery 
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are the most common key management operations. Every public key 
architecture (an architecture that uses PKC systems as their security base) should 
support fundamental key management operations.  
2.4.2. Key Distribution Problems 
In PKC systems, it is essential to bind the one’s identity with his/her public key 
and consequently the private key. The problem of proof of possession of private key is 
called as Key Distribution Problem in PKC systems. In order to solve this problem, a 
trusted third party is inevitably necessary. Trusted third parties are the servers or 
associations that people agree on its trustworthiness. In this way, if trusted third party 
states that a public key belongs to a particular user, then people who trust trusted third 
party make sure about the legitimacy of that public key. 
2.4.3. Digital Certificates 
Digital certificates [22] are common solution for key distribution problem in PKC 
systems. It is a digitally signed document that provides a binding between user’s 
identity and a public key. A digital certificate consists of an information part and a 
signature part. Signature is issued by a trusted third party. Information includes a serial 
number, issuer name, subject name, validity period and the public key, etc. Issuer name 
is the official name of the trusted third party. Subject name is the name of the user that 
will be certified. Validity period is the time period in which the certificate is valid. The 
issuers, i.e. trusted third parties, of certificates are called as Certification Authorities 
(CA). Every CA has to have a digital certificate that is issued by another CA or by itself 
(i.e. self-signed certificates). A CA that has self-signed certificate is the one at the top of 
the hierarchy. Such a CA is called as the Root-CA. 
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2.4.4. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
PKI [23] is an architecture that provides trustworthy certificate distribution and 
management. With the help of PKI services, confidentiality, integrity, authentication 
and non-repudiation services are provided. PKI performs key distribution by issuing 
certificate to its registered users and performs key management by supporting certificate 
revocation and certificate update. PKI must not be thought as a silver bullet. PKI is just 
an infrastructure. In order to utilize PKI, several applications that uses that 
infrastructure must be developed. SSL [24, 25] and S/MIME are successful applications 
that use digital certificates and PKI as an architecture. 
2.4.5. Registration and Certification 
Certification is a process of requesting and getting a certificate from a CA. Every 
user that requests a certificate from a CA has to be registered to a CA registry. Only the 
registered users may have certificates from a CA. Certification can be done both in 
online and offline manner. Both types of certification require identification and 
authentication of the requester. Standard certificate management protocols that contain 
“Initial Registration and Certification Request Protocol” [46], “Key Update Request 
Protocol”, “Key Update Response Protocol”, etc., are defined in RFC 2510 [26]. 
2.4.6. X.500 Directory and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) 
X.500 [27, 28] Directory is described as “a distributed database, capable of 
storing information about people and objects in various nodes or servers distributed 
across a network”. Clients can get certificates or other information from X.500 
Directory by using the Directory Access Protocol (DAP). Because DAP is too 
cumbersome for many client applications, LDAP was developed by University of 
Michigan. It was developed further and standardized in the IETF as LDAPv3 [29]. All 
 20
the certificates that are issued by a CA should be stored in the corresponding  
X.500 Directory. 
2.4.7. Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 
Whenever a CA does not want to permit a specific certificate to be used anymore, 
it revokes that certificate by publishing its serial number in a blacklist called Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL) [22]. CRL includes certificates that have been revoked before 
their scheduled expiration date. Therefore, a CRL does not include expired certificates. 
CRLs are digitally signed by CAs and periodically updated. There are several reasons 
for a certificate to be revoked, such as compromise of private key, change in identity 
and promotion in a job or layoff. 
2.4.8. Authority Revocation List (ARL) 
Sometimes, use of a CA’s certificate is not good anymore and it should be 
revoked. Certificate revocations of CAs are performed in ARL that is signed by upper 
level CA. Inclusion of the serial number of a specific CA’s certificate in ARL means 
that it is not valid anymore. Besides, all of the user certificates of that CA are also 
functionally invalid even they are not revoked in CRL. Because a CA in ARL means 
that it is not a trusted third party anymore. It is sometimes catastrophic to revoke top 
level CAs. 
2.4.9. Key Obtainment 
Key obtainment is a process of getting a public key from the trusted third party. In 
PKI, key obtainment is an easy process that the requester just submits the distinguished 
name of the intended user to LDAP server and gets the certificate of that person. That 
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certificate is verified using the public key of the CA and, consequently, the 
public key of the user is validated. 
2.4.10. Key Update 
Key update is the process of renewing a public key. In PKC systems, periodic 
update of public keys is believed to increase the security of both the user and the 
system. Therefore, certificates are issued only for a limited time period. Suppose that a 
user wants to update his/her public key, first he/she should generate a new key pair. 
Next step is to sign it using old private key and sending this signed public key to the 
CA. CA checks the signature. Having verified it, CA issues a new certificate for the 
user and revokes the old one.  
2.4.11. Path Construction and Certificate Chain 
Path construction is a process of finding out a certification path, which reaches the 
verifier from a specific certificate to its trust anchor’s certificate. That certification path 
is called as certificate chain. Root CA of a specific hierarchical PKI is called as the trust 
anchor of that PKI. Trust anchor’s certificate is the point that trust begins. Path 
construction can be complicated when the PKI architecture is complex. There may be 
several certification paths between two specific certificates.  
2.4.12. Path Validation 
Applications should not use certificates, or public keys contained in them, without 
first constructing the certification path and validating it. Path validation is a process of 
identifying and verifying all of the certificates in the certificate chain. In order to verify 
all certificates in the chain, the verifier has to reach to its trust anchor’s certificate at the 
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beginning. Valid certificates are the certificates that neither they are expired nor 
they are in the revocation lists (CRL or ARL). If any one of the certificates on the 
certificate chain is invalid for any reason, then whole chain becomes invalid too. 
2.4.13. Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) 
MIME [30] is the standard format for Internet e-mail. An Internet e-mail message 
comprises from a header and a body. Header is a structured information (defined in 
RFC 822) that is essential for the message transmission, while body is normally 
unstructured. MIME defines structure of body and permits on e-mail message to include 
graphics, sound, enhanced text, etc. MIME does not provide security services like 
encryption and digital signatures.  
2.4.14. Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 
S/MIME [30] is a standard that adds digital signatures and encryption to MIME. 
S/MIME is supported as an add-on feature for security in e-mail client programs. 
S/MIME compliant applications use digital certificates for the public keys of the users. 
2.4.15. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and Key Ring 
PGP [31] is a widely used e-mail encryption/decryption application in the world 
since it is free, fast and secure. PGP [32, 33] utilizes the digital enveloping mechanism 
while sending an e-mail, therefore it is fast. It uses RSA (512-4096 bits) [13] as a public 
key cryptography algorithm, CAST (128-bits), IDEA (128-bits), 3-DES (168-bits) and 
Twofish (128-bits, 192-bits, or 256-bits) as a symmetric cryptography algorithm, and 
MD-5 (128-bits) and SHA-1 (160-bits) for message digesting. Every user in PGP has a 
key ring (“pubring.pgp” that is actually a signed file by user’s private key) that 
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comprises from well-known friends of the user and constructed by the user 
himself/herself.  There is no precisely defined trusted third party in PGP, rather, every 
user may be a trusted third party and may certify another user. Therefore, a message 
from a person who is not in the receiver’s key ring causes the receiver to hesitate. PGP 
[34] has a network of public key servers for storing all of the public keys. PGP key 
servers provide both key management and key distribution services, but not in 
authenticated manner. 
2.5. Problems and Difficulties of PKI and PGP 
PKI [34] and PGP are the most commonly used mechanisms to solve key 
distribution and management problems especially for e-mail applications. Although 
they provide useful services, they have some problems as will be described in this 
Section. 
2.5.1. Unintended use of Certificates 
Certificates are publicly available digital documents. A certificate may contain 
private information, such as e-mail address [51] that one may not want to disclose. 
Certificates are exchanged during SSL handshake. After that, certificates begin a tour 
on the Internet. If a malicious person catches a certificate, then he/she can easily use the 
e-mail address in it for sending junk mails. Privacy-sensitive people think that this is a 
problem. 
2.5.2. Monetary Cost of Certificates 
The certificates are not free. The corporations sell certificates for a limited period 
(generally for one year). There are some free certificates, which are given for trial 
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purposes. There are some shortcomings related with free certificates. Generally 
their validity periods are too short (a few weeks). The ones issued for longer periods are 
generally issued by unknown CAs, so those certificates are not verified worldwide. Free 
certification services generally offer Class-1 certificates where the identities of the 
certificate holders are not authenticated, but access to a specific e-mail address is 
validated. In this way, corporations aim to introduce and advertise their certification 
service and the corporation itself. In order to get certificates with identity control such 
as Class-2 or Class-3 certificates, customers have to pay money. For example, if a 
customer has a web server that contains peer-to-peer transfer of sensitive data then 
he/she has to buy an SSL web-server certificate about 70 – 80 $ per year.  
2.5.3. Registration Authority in PKI 
In order to obtain a Class-3 certificate one has to identify himself/herself to a CA 
in an offline manner, such that he/she submits his/her ID card, an official document that 
proves the affiliation. In this way, the user is registered to the Registration Authority 
(RA) of that CA. After registration, user obtains a shared-secret generally a MAC 
password, or sometimes physical card such as a smart-card or an e-token that contains 
shared-secret. These registration steps are believed as dissuasive and costly for most of 
the users of the system. 
2.5.4. Self-Signed Certificates 
Sometimes users find themselves in difficult conditions that they are forced to 
decide immediately about whether to trust a self-signed certificate or not. Two 
characteristic examples are the following e-mail exchange and the SSL handshake 
scenarios. 
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• If a user gets a signed e-mail from a user whose certificate belongs to 
another self-signed CA certificate then making a decision would be too difficult.  
• A user may face with a self-signed SSL web server certificate and browser 
asks him/her to decide whether to trust or not. If a user selects not to trust this 
certificate, then he/she cannot see the content. Otherwise, if a user selects to trust 
a self-signed certificate, then there is risk of submitting sensitive information to 
malicious people such as mother’s maiden surname or a secret password. 
2.5.5. Certificate Chains 
Using a certificate without constructing and validating its certification path, is an 
unusual operation. Constructing and validating a long certificate chain is a time-
consuming operation. Having multiple certification paths for a single certificate, makes 
validation more time-consuming.  
2.5.6. Checks from LDAP 
In order to validate a specific certificate, at least three checks from LDAP have to 
be performed. One is the validity period check that is to control whether the current date 
and time is in between the validity interval specified in the certificate or not. The next is 
checking the CRL that aims to understand whether this certificate is revoked or not. The 
final one is the ARL check whose purpose is to decide whether the issuer certificate 
(CA certificate) is in ARL or not. If all checks succeed, then the certificate is accepted 
as a valid certificate. In order to accept an e-mail message as valid, performing so many 
checks for every certificate in the chain is too time-consuming. 
 26
2.5.7. Customization of Key Ring in PGP 
In PGP, key ring is a local file (“pubring.pgp”) in the user’s file system. Key ring 
includes the list of trusted people. Therefore, trusting someone else is left to user only. 
As an example, if a PGP user receives a message from a sender who is not in the 
receiver’s key ring, then decision of trust belongs to user himself/herself. A receiver 
may trust a sender directly or indirectly in PGP. If a receiver trusts a sender directly, 
then receiver adds the sender’s public key to his/her key ring and accepts that sender as 
trusted anymore. In indirect trusting, a receiver may trust a sender who is trusted by 
another PGP user who is in the receiver’s key ring, and then receiver adds the public 
key of sender to his/her key ring. Many people are criticizing this mechanism since they 
believe the users may not have adequate information about public key cryptography. 
Those people accept PGP as a program for PKC experts. 
2.5.8. Absence of Trusted Third Party in PGP 
In PGP, there is a network of public key servers, which are responsible for 
keeping and distributing the users’ public keys. No trusted third party gives guarantee to 
the legitimacy of the public keys in the key servers. Besides, some of the users may 
forget to update their public keys in the corresponding key servers when they update 
their key pairs. Because of the lack of guarantee to the legitimacy of the public keys in 
the key servers, e-mail receivers are forced to decide on trusting the e-mail sender 
themselves alone. Therefore, there is no absolute trust mechanism in PGP. 
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2.6. Alternative Key Management and Distribution Solutions 
Studies on finding out solutions to key management and distribution problems are 
not limited with PKI and PGP. There are several approaches that have been proposed. 
We will discuss two of them briefly in this section. 
2.6.1. Public File Model of Diffie and Hellman 
When Diffie and Hellman had introduced the PKC concept in 1977, they 
proposed a new model for key distribution and management. This is called as Public 
File model. In this model, there is a public file, which is to store the public keys only. 
Writing to this file is restricted, while reading is free. 
2.6.2. Account Authority Model of Wheeler 
Wheeler [36] proposed Account Authority Model for signature verification in 
1990’s. Account authority is a kind of trusted third party. It takes the responsibility of 
keeping all the public keys in the system. If anybody wishes to verify a specific 
signature, he/she sends it to the account authority and waits for response of account 
authority. Account authority checks the signature and returns the verification result to 
requester as valid or invalid signature, but does not disclose public keys. 
2.7. Contribution of Thesis 
As discussed in previous sections, PKI and PGP are well-known systems that 
promise solutions to key distribution and management problems of public key 
cryptography. PKC systems are mostly used in e-mail applications that has several 
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security issues [47, 49]. PGP is itself an e-mail application, while PKI is an 
infrastructure that produces certificates used in Secure Multi-purpose Internet Mail 
Extension (S/MIME), and other applications. Both PGP and PKI have several problems 
and difficulties (discussed in sub-sections of Section 2.5). Moreover, they are 
impractical. In this thesis, we propose a new e-mail system that will be as secure as 
them and more practical. In our system, we design and develop an application that aims 
to provide encrypted and/or signed message exchange between parties by using public 
key cryptography algorithms as a base. Name of our system is “Practical and Secure E-
Mail System” that is called as “PractiSES”. The objectives of PractiSES are below. 
 
• System will solve both key distribution and management problems. 
• Users of the system do not need to have depth information about PKC. 
• System should not propose certificates to solve key distribution problem. 
• Everything should be performed in an online manner even initialization. 
• System should be easy to use and has to have user friendly GUIs. 
• System should provide multi-language support (English and Turkish for the first 
version). 
• Decryption, signature verification and key obtainment services should be performed 
transparent to the users. 
• System should be free. 
• System should sign the header of a message and present only the signed 
information. 
• System should also check the correctness of sender’s name, surname and e-mail 
address from the database of system’s trusted third party while verifying the 
signatures.  
• System should provide authentication of origin, integrity and confidentiality of a 
message and non-repudiation of sender. 
• System should provide sending secure (signed and/or encrypted) e-mails to multiple 
recipients. 
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• System will be designed and implemented for close communities such as 
companies, universities or corporations in version 1.0.  
• System should deserve “PractiSES” name by being practical and secure.  
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3. DESIGN OF PRACTICAL AND SECURE E-MAIL 
SYSTEM (PRACTISES) 
PractiSES has been designed according to the well-defined objectives, which are 
explained in Section 2.7. First version of PractiSES will be a corporate version. It will 
serve to close groups. With its “Cross-Trust Module”, PractiSES will serve to users of 
different groups in the next version. While designing PractiSES, every step of “Object 
Oriented Analyses and Design (OOAD) [37, 38]” has been performed systematically. 
First, the requirements of the system were clearly specified and documented in the 
requirement analyses phase. After that, system and application classes were determined 
in the design phase. Finally, the implementation and testing step is performed. 
Implementation details will be discussed in Section 4.  
 
Figure 9. Practical and Secure Email System (PractiSES) 
 31
3.1. PractiSES Architecture and Properties 
As it is shown in Figure 9, PractiSES comprises from three parts, which are 
“PractiSES Server”, “PractiSES Client” and “Connection Protocols”. All parts are 
implemented in Java [39]. Server and clients need a “Mail Server” to exchange e-mails 
(using Simple Mail Transport Protocol  (SMTP) [40]). 
3.2. PractiSES Server 
It is the server side of the system. It consists of a public key storage and a 
management module. Public key storage is an information database of users. 
Management module co-works with and operates on the public key storage. PractiSES 
Server is managed by an administrator. PractiSES Server has a key-pair, which 
comprises from public and private key. Public key is available to everyone from a 
public web or ftp site. Private key is stored in the server’s file system as encrypted. 
Only the administrator may know the password of that file. PractiSES Server is set up 
on a special server machine that operates fast and has high storage capacity. It should be 
located in a secure room, into which no unauthorized person can enter. Both the 
management module and public key storage run on the same machine.  
3.2.1. Public Key Storage 
Public key storage is a database that keeps all the public keys and authentication 
information of registered users in the system. Only an administrator via the management 
module may access to the information in the public key storage.  
Public key storage contains values of ID, name, surname, e-mail address and 
shared-secret information (e.g. mother’s maiden surname) of the potential users. It is 
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assumed that such information exists in organization’s records and they are 
conveyed to the public key storage. This potential user information is used for partial 
user authentication during the initialization protocols.  
During the connection protocols, storage may be updated to store the MAC 
passwords and public keys of users. 
3.2.2. Management Module (MM) 
Management module is a software that operates on the public key storage. Only 
an administrator can start the server by submitting a password as shown in Figure 26.  
MM has a GUI, by which an administrator may have a chance to perform service 
operations, registration operations and security operations. With service operations, 
administrator can start/stop PractiSES Server and monitor the important events from 
logger screen. With registration operations, administrator can register a new user to the 
system, update his/her information, or remove him/her. With security operations, 
administrator can generate/update key pair of the server, inform users about key update, 
and generate MAC passwords of users.  
Beside the GUI operations, MM is an entity of the connection protocols that are 
responsible for authenticating a user, storing the public key of a user, and responding to 
public key obtainment/removal/update requests etc. MM listens to the clients’ 
connection requests on a specific port. It processes the clients’ requests in a concurrent 
manner. It has a connection manager (master server) to assign different threads (slave 
servers) according to clients’ connections. 
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3.2.3. Security Aspects of PractiSES Server 
There are three security aspects of PractiSES Server:  
(1) Physical security of the server machine and the public key storage: No one can 
stop servicing the PractiSES Server by turning the machine off, since both the 
management module and the public key storage run on the same machine and 
machine is in a physically secure room. 
 
(2) Security of information in the public key storage:  Access to the public key 
storage is restricted only to the administrator and the management module. 
Because MM guarantees the operations’ security by secure connection 
protocols, security and ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation and 
Durability) properties of public key storage are satisfied after every 
transaction. 
 
(3) Security of server’s private key: The private key of server is kept as encrypted 
in the server’s file system. In case server’s private key is lost, MM has an 
option to update the key pair of the server and informing users about that. 
3.3. PractiSES Client 
It is the client side of the system. It comprises from only an e-mail client module 
with additional security options. Client module may run on any PC. As all other e-mail 
client systems, PractiSES Client needs an SMTP server (not necessarily the same one 
that MM is connected). 
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3.3.1. Client Module (CM) 
CM is the software behind the PractiSES Client. It has user friendly GUI. 
Moreover, it has security tools that provide secure data exchange between clients and 
the server. Security tools are actually the connection protocols that can be triggered 
from the menu bar of the GUI. Initializator, key updater, key remover, and key pair 
generator are the security tools of CM. As an example, initializator starts initialization 
protocol, provides key pair generation, and uploads the public key to the server’s public 
key storage. 
After a user, who has an e-mail account on the mail server, authenticates 
himself/herself to the mail server can use the CM to send/receive emails. Several users 
can use a single CM on the same machine, since CM supports changing the current user 
by a new one with the account’s password of new user. Every account owner may 
create his/her own “account.ini” file on the local file system that keeps account settings. 
The users who have not created the “account.ini” file cannot use the CM. 
In order to run a CM, an account holder should select his/her account as shown in 
Figure 27 and submit a correct password for it as shown in Figure 28. He/she has at 
most three chances to submit a correct password, otherwise program exits. If he/she 
submits the correct password, then CM asks him/her for whether to start the 
“initialization and key settlement protocol” immediately or not. If he/she selects starting 
the protocol immediately, then his/her key pair is generated and the public key is 
uploaded to the public key storage of PractiSES Server. Consequently, the 
corresponding private key is stored on clients’ local disk in encrypted manner. Before 
signing a message or decrypting an encrypted message for a user, the password dialog 
will ask the private key password of that user in CM as shown in Figure 29. User has a 
chance to start the “initialization and key settlement protocol” later, since PractiSES 
Client GUI has a menu to trigger that protocol. 
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Although a CM can be used as a classical e-mail client, its superiority lies 
in its security tools. PractiSES users, can send/receive signed and/or encrypted e-mails 
as shown in Figures 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 of Appendix C. Another plus of 
PractiSES Client is that signature verification process of CM also compares the name, 
surname and e-mail address of sender in the message with the values in public key 
storage, and informs the result of any mismatch to receivers.  
PractiSES Client supports sending secure (signed and/or encrypted) e-mails to 
multiple recipients. There is no limitation to number of recipients in sending secure e-
mails.   
3.4. Mail Server and SMTP 
Mail Server is the one of the important parts of PractiSES. Both the server and the 
clients need it. Server needs a mail server to distribute the MAC passwords to the 
clients. Mail server may also be used by server to inform users about server’s key 
update. Clients need it each time they send either a secure or a non-secure e-mail. Mail 
server relays all messages using Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP). 
3.5. Connection Protocols  
Connection protocols are implemented in both Management Module (MM) and 
Client Module (CM) by using Java. The most appealing characteristic of the connection 
protocols is their security features. The protocols are leveraged on TCP/IP protocol 
stack. MM and CM are connected to each other over TCP sockets.  
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The secure connection protocols are: 
(i) Initialization and Public Key Settlement Protocol (InitKeySet)  
(ii) Public Key Obtainment Protocol (KeyObt)  
(iii) Public Key Removal Protocol (KeyRem)  
(iv) Public Key Updating Protocol (KeyUpdate) 
(v) Un-signed Public Key Removal Protocol (USKeyRem)  
(vi) Un-signed Public Key Updating Protocol (USKeyUpdate) 
3.5.1. Initialization and Public Key Settlement Protocol (InitKeySet) 
Initial interaction between CM and MM is the initialization phase. First, an end 
user introduces and authenticates himself/herself to the MM. Then, user’s public key is 
uploaded to the public key storage of PractiSES Server. In order to authenticate the 
clients, MM uses clients’ private information that already exist in the public key 
storage, such as ID, shared-secret, birthday and some other identity information. The 
sequence diagram of InitKeySet protocol is presented in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Sequence Diagram of InitKeySet Protocol 
Details of the protocol: 
1. PractiSES Client connects to the PractiSES Server. An end user introduces 
himself/herself to the server by providing his/her ID and email address with a 
protocol-ID as “0”. (Protocol-ID = 0 means that protocol is InitKeySet). First, 
server detects the protocol-ID as “0” and executes the InitKeySet protocol in the 
server side. 
2. The server checks and validates user ID and email address from the public key 
storage. If the submitted information is correct, then server asks user for private 
information. Server signs the questions before they are sent. 
3. Client sends the answer encrypted using a secret key and the secret key 
encrypted using server’s public key. 
4. Server gets the secret key that is encrypted with server’s public key and decrypts 
the user’s answer. If answer is correct, then server sends an e-mail that contains 
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server-given MAC password encrypted by using the secret key. 
Otherwise protocol stops and socket is closed. 
5. Client decrypts the MAC password from that e-mail. It uses this password to 
provide integrity for the message that contains his/her public key. 
6. Server checks the MAC within the message that contains the user’s public key. 
If verified, then public key is stored in the public key storage. Server sends a 
confirmation message about successful/unsuccessful key upload. Protocol 
finishes. 
This protocol can be figured out in a state diagram as in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
  Figure 11. State Diagram of InitKeySet Protocol 
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3.5.2. Public Key Obtainment Protocol (KeyObt) 
The easiest and mostly used protocol of PractiSES is KeyObt protocol. A user 
may need another user’s public key to send an encrypted e-mail and verify that user’s 
signatures. To get another user’s public key from the public key storage, KeyObt 
protocol is designed. The protocol does not need to identify the requester’s credentials 
since everybody can learn each other’s public key. The sequence diagram of KeyObt 
protocol is presented in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Sequence Diagram of KeyObt Protocol 
Details of the protocol: 
1. PractiSES Client connects to PractiSES Server. An end user sends the protocol 
ID as “2” and the e-mail address of the intended person. First, server identifies 
the protocol ID and gets the intended person’s public key from public key 
storage. If no such user or public key belonging to that user in the public key 
storage, then protocol returns an error code. 
2. Server delivers the name, last name, e-mail address and public key of target user 
to the requester. Before sending this information, they are signed by server’s 
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private key. In this way, requester can make sure about the legitimacy of 
the public key and the other information it received. Protocol finishes. 
 
This protocol can be figured out in a state diagram as in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. State Diagram of KeyObt Protocol 
3.5.3. Public Key Removal Protocol (KeyRem) 
In the case of compromise of a user’s private key, that user must remove his/her 
public key from the public key storage. This can be accomplished using the KeyRem 
protocol. The most important property of KeyRem is that the requester should sign the 
request by current private key while removing corresponding public key. The sequence 
diagram of KeyRem protocol is presented in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Sequence Diagram of KeyRem Protocol 
Details of the protocol: 
1. PractiSES Client connects to the PractiSES Server. First, an end user introduces 
himself/herself to the server by providing his/her user ID and e-mail address 
with protocol ID “4”.  Then, he/she signs the message “I want to remove my 
public key from storage” using his/her private key. 
2. The server identifies the protocol ID and verifies the user’s signature. If 
signature is valid then protocol continues, otherwise server closes the connection 
and the protocol finishes unsuccessfully. The server does not literally remove 
the public key, but marks it as deleted and puts a date and a time of deletion. 
That public key should not be used after marked deletion time. Protocol finishes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
This protocol can be figured out in a state diagram as in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15. State Diagram of KeyRem Protocol 
3.5.4. Public Key Update Protocol (KeyUpdate) 
A user may want to update current public key in the public key storage. One 
reason may be a key compromise. It is also recommended to update the keys 
periodically for the sake of improved security. Key update can be accomplished using 
the KeyUpdate protocol.  
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The sequence diagram of KeyUpdate protocol is presented in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Sequence Diagram of KeyUpdate Protocol 
Details of the protocol: 
1. PractiSES Client connects to the PractiSES Server. An end user introduces 
himself/herself to the server by providing the his/her ID and an email address, 
with protocol ID “6”. Then, he/she signs the message “I want to update my 
public key from storage” and the new public key using his/her private key. First, 
server identifies the protocol ID and verifies the user’s signature. If signature is 
valid and user identified, then protocol continues otherwise server closes the 
connection and the protocol finishes unsuccessfully. 
2. Server first disables the current public key by putting a “deleted” flag. Finally, it 
adds the new public key into the public key storage. Protocol finishes. 
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This protocol can be figured out in a state diagram as in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17. State Diagram of KeyUpdate Protocol 
3.5.5. Un-Signed Public Key Removal Protocol (USKeyRem) 
A user may want to remove current public key from the public key storage, even 
if the corresponding private key is lost. In this way, the user suspends using PractiSES 
till setting new public key to the storage. Since the private key is lost, the user cannot 
run the KeyRem protocol. USKeyRem protocol is designed to remove keys in an 
authentic manner, even if the corresponding private key is not available. The difference 
of this protocol is that USKeyRem uses MAC instead of digital signatures for integrity 
and authentication purposes. The sequence diagram of USKeyRem protocol is presented 
in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Sequence Diagram of USKeyRem Protocol 
Details of the protocol: 
1. PractiSES Client connects to the PractiSES Server. An end user introduces 
himself/herself to the server by providing the user ID and an e-mail address, 
with protocol ID “8”. First, the server identifies the protocol-ID as “8” and 
executes the USKeyRem protocol in the server side.  
2. Server checks and validates user ID and e-mail address from the public key 
storage. If submitted information is correct, then the server asks the user for 
private information. Server signs the questions before they are sent. 
3. User sends the answer encrypted using a secret key and the secret key encrypted 
using server’s public key. 
4. Server gets the secret key that is encrypted with server’s public key and decrypts 
the user’s answer. If answer is correct, then server sends an e-mail that contains 
server-given MAC password encrypted by using the secret key. Otherwise 
protocol stops and socket is closed. 
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5. User decrypts the MAC password from that e-mail. He/she uses this 
password to provide integrity for the message  “I want to remove my current 
public key”. 
6. Server checks the MAC within the message that contains key remove request. If 
verified, then it disables the current public key from the public key storage by 
setting a “deleted” flag. Server sends a confirmation message about 
successful/unsuccessful key removal. Protocol finishes. 
 
This protocol can be figured out in a state diagram as in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19. State Diagram of USKeyRem Protocol 
3.5.6. Un-Signed Public Key Update Protocol (USKeyUpdate) 
A user may want to update current public key in the public key storage, even if 
the corresponding private key is lost. Since the private key is lost, the user cannot run 
the KeyUpdate protocol. USKeyUpdate protocol is designed to update keys in an 
authentic manner, even if the corresponding private key is not available. The difference 
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is that USKeyUpdate uses MAC instead of digital signatures for integrity and 
authentication purposes. The sequence diagram of USKeyUpdate protocol is presented 
in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. Sequence Diagram of USKeyUpdate Protocol 
Details of the protocol: 
1. PractiSES Client connects to the PractiSES Server. An end user introduces 
himself/herself to a server by providing the user ID and an e-mail address, with 
protocol ID “10”. First, the server detects the protocol-ID as “10” and executes 
the USKeyUpdate protocol in the server side.  
2. The server checks and validates user ID and e-mail address from the public key 
storage. If the submitted information is correct, then the server asks user for 
private information from the storage. Server signs the questions before they are 
sent. 
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3. User sends the answer encrypted using a secret key and the secret key 
encrypted using server’s public key. 
4. Server gets the secret key that is encrypted with server’s public key and decrypts 
the user’s answer. If answer is correct, then server sends an e-mail that contains 
server-given MAC password encrypted by using the secret key. Otherwise 
protocol stops and socket is closed. 
5. User decrypts the MAC password from that e-mail, and then he/she uses this 
password to provide integrity for the message that contains his/her update 
request and public key to the server. 
6. Server checks the MAC within the message that contains update request and 
new public key. If verified, then it disables the current public key from the 
public key storage by setting a “deleted” flag. And then it puts new public key to 
the public key storage. Finally, server sends a confirmation message about 
successful/unsuccessful key update. Protocol finishes. 
 
This protocol can be figured out in a state diagram as in Figure 21. 
 
 
 
Figure 21. State Diagram of USKeyUpdate Protocol 
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3.6. Advantages of PractiSES over PKI and PGP 
PractiSES is not only an architecture, which provides key distribution and 
management, but also an e-mail client that provides both insecure (normal e-mail) and 
secure (encrypted and/or signed) e-mail exchange. Moreover, it has several advantages 
over S/MIME (uses digital certificates of PKIs) and PGP. They are presented below: 
• Users in PractiSES must not need to have depth information about public key 
cryptography which is the case in PGP. 
• PractiSES delivers the public keys and other information of user only to group 
members. Therefore, the problem discussed in Section 2.5.1 does not exist in 
PractiSES. 
• In PractiSES, there is no monetary cost of delivering public keys that is 
discussed in Section 2.5.2. 
• Every key operation, even initialization, can be performed in an online manner 
in PractiSES.   
• Since the information about potential PractiSES users have already been entered 
to the database, they do not have to perform an offline registration. This is a 
solution to problem discussed in Section 2.5.3. 
• Since there is a single trusted third party (server) for users of a specific group, 
the problems discussed in Section 2.5.4, 2.5.5, and 2.5.6 do not exist in 
PractiSES. 
• PractiSES is easy to use and has a user friendly GUI. 
• PractiSES provides multi-language support (English and Turkish for v1.0). 
• Decryption, signature verification and key obtainment services are performed  
transparent to the users. 
• PractiSES is freeware software, and available from the project’s web site [50]. 
• In PractiSES, the message headers are signed by the sender, and only the signed 
information is presented to the receiver. It does not exist in S/MIME. 
• Verification process of signed messages in PractiSES includes also controlling 
the name, surname and e-mail address of sender. It does not exist in S/MIME. 
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• PractiSES supports sending secure (signed and/or encrypted) e-mails to 
multiple recipients.  
• PractiSES is deserving its name, since it is more practical than both S/MIME 
and PGP and it is secure enough. 
 51
4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
While implementing PractiSES, some cryptographic structures and functions are 
used. Details of these structures and functions, and then deployment of the system will 
be covered in this section. 
4.1. Cryptographic Functions of PractiSES 
There several cryptographic functions that are implemented and used in 
PractiSES. All the security functions are gathered within “PractiSES.crypto” package. 
Some of the critical cryptographic functions of PractiSES are signature/verification, 
encryption/decryption, HMAC, key-pair generation, etc.  
4.1.1. Secret Key Generator 
To generate random numbers, PractiSES uses pseudo random number generator 
function of  “SecureRandom” object of  “javax.crypto” library. Generated random 
number is used as an input (salt) to the “SecretKeyFactory” object.  “SecretKeyFactory” 
generates a secret key for 3-DES (Triple DES). 
4.1.2. Key Pair Generator 
PractiSES has a “PractiSES.crypto.SESKeyPairGenerator” object to generate 
2048-bit key pair (i.e. public key and private key) for RSA cryptosystem. 
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4.1.3. Signature and Verification 
PractiSES has a “PractiSES.crypto.SESSignature” object to sign a message and 
verify a signature. “SESSignature” uses SHA-1 algorithm to get 160-bit digest from a 
message and uses RSA algorithm to sign that digest. While signing, “SESSignature” 
takes message and private key as an input and finds out the signature as an output. 
Reversely in verification, it takes signature, message and public key as inputs and 
returns valid/invalid decision as an output. 
4.1.4. Symmetric Encryption/Decryption 
PractiSES uses its “PractiSES.crypto.TripleDESSymmetricEncryption” object to 
encrypt/decrypt cleartext/ciphertext. While encrypting, it uses cleartext and secret key  
and finds out ciphertext. Reversely, it uses ciphertext and secret key and finds out the 
cleartext while decrypting. Algorithm used in both encryption and decryption is 3-DES 
(Triple-DES). 
4.1.5. Public Key Encryption/Decryption 
PractiSES uses “PractiSES.crypto.RSAEncryption” object to encrypt/decrypt 
cleartext/ciphertext. It uses cleartext and recipients public key to encrypt the message 
that yields ciphertext. While decrypting, it uses ciphertext and corresponding private 
key to find out the original cleartext. Algorithm used in both public key encryption and 
decryption is RSA. 
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4.1.6. Hash-based MAC 
To generate an integrity check value with a one-way hash function, HMAC is the 
most common method of using a shared secret. PractiSES has a 
“PractiSES.crypto.SESEncDecMac” object to calculate HMAC [41] of a message. 
HMAC function produces fixed length message authentication code. SHA-1 algorithm 
is used as a one-way hash function 
4.2. Cryptographic Structures of  PractiSES 
Cryptographic structures that are used for message transmission in PractiSES are 
discussed in this section. 
4.2.1. Signed Message 
A Signed message consists of two parts: one is the message itself and the other is 
the digital signature over the message. Before signing a message, message digest (a.k.a. 
message hash) is produced from message using SHA-1 algorithm. SHA-1 always 
generates 160-bit digest from the variable length message. The digest of message is 
used in signing process. RSA algorithm (2048-bits) is used while signing. Message and 
the signature of message constitute signed message structure of PractiSES as shown in 
Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Signed Message 
Note that, whole message is signed in PractiSES even e-mail header. The content 
of the signed message is shown in Figure 39 of Appendix D. 
4.2.2. Encrypted Message 
PractiSES utilizes digital enveloping mechanism while encrypting a message. An 
encrypted message consists of two parts: one is the message that is encrypted with a 
random secret key and the other is the secret key that is encrypted with the public key of 
receiver. Before encrypting a message, a secret key is randomly selected and it is used 
for encrypting the message. Besides, secret key is encrypted with a public key of 
receiver. 3-DES algorithm is used for encrypting the message and the RSA algorithm is 
used for encrypting the secret key. The encrypted key and the encrypted message 
constitute the encrypted message structure of PractiSES as shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Encrypted Message 
The content of the encrypted message is shown in Figure 40 of Appendix D.  
4.2.3. Signed and Encrypted Message 
Signed and encrypted message of PractiSES is the combination of signature and 
encryption procedures. Signed and encrypted message consists of three parts: (i) 
message that is encrypted with a random secret key; (ii) secret key that is encrypted 
with public key of the receiver, and (iii) the digital signature of message. 3-DES 
algorithm is used for encrypting the message and the RSA algorithm is used for 
encrypting the secret key and signing the message. Before encrypting a message, a 
secret key is randomly selected and it is used for encrypting the message. Besides, the 
secret key is encrypted with the public key of receiver. At the end, sender digitally signs 
hash of the message. SHA-1 algorithm is used to get hash of the message. The 
encrypted key, an encrypted message and digital signature of the original message 
constitute the signed and encrypted message structure of PractiSES as shown in Figure 
24. 
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Figure 24. Signed and Encrypted Message 
The content of the signed and encrypted message is shown in Figure 41 of 
Appendix D.  Note that, all information is either encrypted or signed. 
4.2.4. Message Authentication Coded (MACed) Message 
PractiSES uses MAC to provide integrity in transmitted messages in the absence 
of digital signatures. A MACed message consists of two parts: one is the message itself 
and the other is MAC of the message. A shared-secret is used while producing MAC of 
the message. Shared-secret is appended to the end of the message and then this 
combination is given to the MAC function. Message and MAC result constitute the 
MACed message structure in PractiSES as shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. MACed Message 
4.3. Requirements 
In this section, necessary libraries, database and system properties are explained. 
Basically, PractiSES needs MySQL as a database tool, Java Cryptographic Environment 
(JCE1.2.2) as the cryptographic base and Java Mail as an e-mail client.  
4.3.1. System Requirements 
In order to run PractiSES Client, it is enough for any personal computer to have 
java runtime environment (over jre1.3). However, PractiSES Server should be relatively 
faster computer, because the server will be able to serve multiple users at the same time 
and needs to have java database connectivity (jdbc) with MySQL Server. 
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4.3.2. MySQL 
MySQL is a free database management tool. PractiSES uses it as the public key 
storage. MySQL server should run on the same machine with PractiSES Server. 
4.3.3. Java Cryptographic Environment (JCE) 
JCE provides many cryptographic functions that are necessary in PractiSES. 3-
DES, SHA-1 and RSA algorithms [42, 43, 44, 45] are used from JCE.  
4.3.4. Java Mail 
Java Mail is a free e-mail tool. PractiSES Clients use its e-mail sending/receiving 
methods to send/receive e-mails. 
4.4. Deployment of System 
PractiSES Server and Client softwares will be available in the project’s web page 
[50]. In order to use PractiSES, MySQL Server, PractiSES Server and PractiSES Client 
applications should be downloaded. Initially, both the PractiSES Server and MySQL 
Server are set up. While server is being set up, key pair of PractiSES Server is generated 
and the public key storage tables are created on MySQL. The password for private key 
should be known by the “administrator”. Administrator should make the server’s public 
key reachable to all group members from a web or an ftp site. Lastly, from PractiSES 
Server’s GUI, administrator should make necessary settings such as mail server IP, 
database user name, password etc.  
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In the client side, client first downloads the client application and sets it 
up to his/her PC. Consequently, client downloads the server’s public key from a web 
site that server informed. Secondly, he/she performs security settings such as defining a 
profile, mail server IP etc. Lastly, he/she triggers the “InitKeySet” protocol from his/her 
client GUI and uploads his/her public key to public key storage. Note that, PractiSES 
Server and public key storage must be located in a physically secure room. The system 
is now ready for all registered and initialized users to exchange secure emails. Other 
users (uninitialized users) can use the client software for normal e-mail exchange. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
PractiSES proposes a new key distribution and management mechanism for e-
mail applications. It takes advantage over S/MIME by escaping use of certificates and 
over PGP by less complicated trust mechanism based on a trusted third party. It 
provides key distribution in real-time by sending requested public keys with trusted 
third party’s signature on it. It is a practical key distribution mechanism that does not 
require any kind of revocation control. 
Current version of PractiSES is designed for closed-group communication. In 
PractiSES, it is presumed that the members of closed-group is already registered to 
group registry. Therefore, the users just need to download the client application 
software  and upload newly generated public keys to the public key storage.  
PractiSES proposes signing e-mail headers before transmission. That provides 
integrity for the information in the header. Such an integrity is not provided in S/MIME. 
Besides, PractiSES proposes comparing the name, surname and e-mail address of 
sender in the signed header with the values in the corresponding public key storage. 
Such control is not provided in S/MIME either. 
PractiSES has a practical and easy-to-use GUI. User-transparent nature of 
encrypting/decrypting and signing/verifying a message in PractiSES is its another plus. 
Besides, PractiSES supports both English and Turkish. All the GUI components and 
application messages are displayed in selected language. 
The support for sending secure (signed and/or encrypted) e-mails to multiple 
recipients also makes PractiSES as an attractive system. 
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PractiSES is a freeware system. Moreover, there are no export restrictions 
in PractiSES. 
We plan some future works to make PractiSES more successful. These are 
explained below. 
In future, PractiSES servers will provide cross-trust between each other. The first 
version of PractiSES is for internal use in a group. Different users that belong to 
different PractiSES Servers (different groups) will be able to exchange signed and/or 
encrypted messages in the future.  
In this version, signed messages with obsolete private keys cannot be verified 
since public key storage distributes only current public key to the requester. In the next 
version, a key history module will be added. This module will be used to distribute old 
public keys as well. 
We will develop plug-ins for popular e-mail client programs to allow PractiSES 
users continue to use their popular e-mail client programs.  
In order to increase the security of the system, the private key of PractiSES Server 
can be kept in a physical device such as smart-card or e-token. Since this is only for the 
server, it will not change the monetary cost for the clients.  
Security model of PractiSES can be standardized or documented as an IETF 
Internet Draft. Especially after Cross-Trust module, it will be necessary to standardize 
the structures and the model. 
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6. APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
CA    Certification Authority  
CRL    Certificate Revocation List 
ARL    Authority Revocation List 
DAP    Directory Access Protocol  
LDAP    Lightweight Directory Access Protocol  
DES    Data Encryption Standard  
HTTP    HyperText Transfer Protocol  
IDEA    International Data Encryption Algorithm  
IETF    Internet Engineering Task Force  
IP   Internet Protocol 
ISO    International Standards Organization  
ITU    International Telecommunications Union  
MD4   Message Digest 4  
MD5   Message Digest 5  
NIST    National Institute of Standards and Technology 
PGP    Pretty Good Privacy  
PKC   Public Key Crypto(graphy) 
PKCS   Public Key Cryptography Standards 
PKI   Public Key Infrastructure 
PKIX   Internet Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 certificates  
RFC    Request for Comments  
RSA   Rivest, Shamir, Adleman 
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MIME    Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 
S/MIME   Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions  
SHA-1   Secure Hash Algorithm 1  
S-HTTP   Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol  
SSL    Secure Socket Layer  
TLS   Transport Layer Security 
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7. APPENDIX B: SECURITY DIALOGS 
 
Figure 26. Starting PractiSES Server Dialog 
 
Figure 27. Starting PractiSES Client Dialog 
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Figure 28. User Login Dialog 
 
Figure 29. Message Signing/Decrypting Dialog 
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8. APPENDIX C: MESSAGE SENDING/RECEIVING 
8.1. Sending 
 
Figure 30. Normal Message 
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Figure 31. Signed Message 
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Figure 32. Encrypted Message 
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Figure 33. Encrypted and Signed Message 
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8.2. Receiving 
 
Figure 34. Normal Message 
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Figure 35. Signed Message 
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Figure 36. Encrypted Message 
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Figure 37. Encrypted and Signed Message 
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9. APPENDIX D: MESSAGE STRUCTURES 
 
Figure 38. Normal Message 
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Figure 39. Signed Message 
 76
 
Figure 40. Encrypted Message 
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Figure 41. Encrypted and Signed Message 
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